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INTRODUCTION
Jeannie Ralston, an author and journalist, owned an apartment southwest
of Austin, Texas, which she used to lease as a long-term rental, for $650 a
month.1 “Jump[ing] on the Airbnb gravy train,” as she describes it in a New
York Times column, she and her husband decided to take the apartment off
the long-term rental market and turn it into a short-term rental.2 Their
calculation was that it would take only six nights of renting through Airbnb
for them to make the equivalent of a month’s rent under their long-term
lease.3 Ryan Scott took it one step further: he owns twelve properties and
manages ten more in San Diego, California—all used for short-term rentals
via Airbnb.4 The reporter says that Ryan, in an interview, confessed that
*
Assistant Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia. I
would like to thank Melissa J. Durkee for helpful conversations about this article. I am also
indebted to Sara Gold for her excellent research assistance. And I am grateful to the
members of the University of Hawaiʻi Law Review for the productive symposium that
generated this piece as well as for their exceptional editorial work.
1
See Jeannie Ralston, How to Survive Being an Airbnb Host, N.Y. TIMES (June 21,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/travel/airbnb-host.html.
2
See id.
3
See id.
4
See Lori Weisberg, Airbnb: Opportunity or Nuisance?, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE
(June 10, 2016, 12:00 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/tourism/sdutairbnb-opportunity-or-nuisance-2016jun10-story.html.
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“he has become addicted to the intoxicating short-term rental revenues
[that] his properties have been generating over the last few years.”5
Michael Naess, who lives in a two-bedroom apartment in Queens, New
York, rented one of his bedrooms to seventy-two guests in ten months—
using Airbnb.6 The guests stay in the extra bedroom in his apartment.7
Finally, Jordan Reeves occasionally rents out his Brooklyn apartment while
he is away.8
What is common to all of these cases? They all involve properties rented
for short-term stays (under thirty days) via Airbnb. But that is where the
similarities end. Each one of the lessors uses Airbnb for a different type of
short-term rental. Jeannie Ralston’s operation is akin to a bed and
breakfast.9 Ryan Scott uses apartments for investment; he finds some that
were rented long term, takes them off the residency market, and converts
them to vacation rentals.10 Michael Naess rents his unoccupied room to
make some extra money on a permanent basis.11 And Jordan Reeves
subleases on a temporary basis when his apartment is empty because he is
away.12
One key distinguishing factor between these activities, I argue, is the
level (or lack) of utilization of excess capacity. Increased utilization of
excess capacity means leveraging the “‘surplus value’ of these unused or
under-utilized assets” to create “more capacity than the owner can herself
use at once and that can thereby be monetized.”13 Some types of use that
on-demand platforms facilitate leverage this “idle capacity,” making sure
that goods and skills that can be monetized are not wasted.14 Conversely,
other usage is akin to conventional commercial use—not significantly
different from the supply that incumbents provide. By “on-demand
5

See id.
See N. R. Kleinfield, Airbnb Host Welcomes Travelers from All Over, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/nyregion/airbnb-host-welcomestravelers-from-all-over.html.
7
See id.
8
See Deepti Hajela, Some New York City Hosts are Confused About New Airbnb
Advertising Law, SKIFT (Oct. 30, 2016, 7:00 PM), https://skift.com/2016/10/30/some-newyork-city-hosts-are-still-confused-about-new-airbnb-advertising-law/.
9
See Ralston, supra note 1.
10
See Weisberg, supra note 4.
11
See Kleinfield, supra note 6.
12
See Hajela, supra note 8.
13
See Donald J. Kochan, I Share, Therefore It’s Mine, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
May 2017) (manuscript at 25) (on file with SSRN), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2820456.
14
See Orly Lobel, The Law of Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 108 (2016) (“A key
principle of the platform is putting idle capacity to work.”).
6
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economy” (often referred to by the misnomer “the sharing economy”),15 I
mean an economic model where people—for profit—exchange goods,
services, spaces, and money with each other via peer-to-peer platforms.16
I hence consider activities that the on-demand platforms facilitate on a
spectrum: one end consists of activities in increased utilization of excess
capacity, and the other end is composed of traditional commercial work
without utilization of idle capacity. I will call activities on the former end
“casual work,” “work in increased excess capacity,” or work “in increased
utilization.” I will call activities on the latter end—i.e., those not grounded
primarily in utilization of excess capacity—“conventional work,”
“commercial work,” or “excess in disguise.”
Accordingly, we can rank all of the above examples on a spectrum based
on their level of use—or lack thereof—of increased excess capacity. Scott,
who rents twenty-two units, creates new capacity (infrastructure) when he
buys properties intended exclusively for short-term rentals.17 Ralston, who
converted one unit from long-term to short-term rental, uses existing
capacity by changing the purpose of the infrastructure she already has.18
Conversely, Reeves and Naess capitalize on their otherwise underutilized
goods to produce more income.19 But these two are different, too; the
former rents occasionally, while the latter has turned an empty room into a
permanent vacation unit.
Yet, despite the differences in use of these properties, and the different
economic and societal consequences of each of these uses, the law in many
jurisdictions still treats three of these cases as the same activity: with the
exception of Naess,20 all these uses are illegal in most jurisdictions in the
United States and in other Western democracies abroad.21
15

“‘[S]haring’ and [other] kindred designations are misnomers. Even if there are some
altruistic or communal motives among those in the P2P economy, the heart of the industry is
financial gain and not altruistic exchanges.” Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the Sharing Economy,
91 WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1407 (2016). Thus, in this Article, to avoid this misnomer I use the
term “on-demand economy.”
16
Id. at 1410 (defining the peer-to-peer economy as “an economic model where people
exchange goods, services, space, and money with each other via peer-to-peer platforms”).
17
See Weisberg, supra note 4.
18
See Ralston, supra note 1.
19
See Hajela, supra note 8; Kleinfield, supra note 6.
20
Naess’s rental is lawful in presumably all jurisdictions because he is in the property
during the lessee’s (“guest’s”) entire stay.
21
See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 4-6-300(h)(8), 4-14-060(d) (prohibiting short-term
rental unless unit is homeowner’s “primary residence”); HONOLULU, HAW., LAND USE
ORDINANCE § 21-10.1 (2016) (prohibiting short-term rentals for periods of less than thirty
days); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(8)(a) (prohibiting short-term rental unless permanent
resident occupies unit concurrently with visitor); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 27, § 287.1
(banning advertising of short-term rentals that violate the NEW YORK MULTIPLE DWELLING
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In this Article, I submit that activities facilitated by the on-demand
platforms produce a different level of negative and positive externalities,
based on their location along the spectrum of increased utilization.
Transactions in increased excess capacity produce the fewest negative
externalities and produce more positive externalities; the more we move
along the spectrum toward no use of excess capacity, the more negative
externalities the activity produces. As such, a unique set of rules—tailored
to address the particular benefits and harms that stem from each activity—
should govern each category.
This distinction between work in increased excess capacity and other
conventional uses in disguise is also prevalent in other sectors of the “ondemand economy.” For example, in the transportation arena some drivers
for Uber work part-time, leveraging their increased excess capacity in terms
of labor.22 Similarly, some drivers use their private, not-for-business
vehicle, thus monetizing the time during which their car otherwise would
not be serving an economically useful end.23 Others, conversely, work full
time as drivers, using vehicles with the primary purpose of transporting
passengers.24 The point is that the on-demand economy, although it often
promotes the exchange of activities based on increased excess capacity, is
also used simply as an alternative business method to commercial offerings
that do not utilize idle capacity.
The distinction between the level of increased utilization—or the lack of
such increase—is crucial to understanding and evaluating the social and
economic costs that the on-demand economy produces. First, activities in
increased excess capacity expand valuable choice, both for consumers and

LAW); Zweckentfremdungsverbot-Gesetz [ZwVbG] [Act on the Prohibition of Illegal
Repurposing of Housing], Nov. 29, 2013; GESETZ-UND VERORDNUNGSBLATT FÜR BERLIN
[BLN GVBl.] at 626, § 2(1) (Ger.) (defining “illegal repurposing of housing” to include the
use of an entire home as a vacation rental). See generally Michele Finck & Sofia
Ranchordás, Sharing and the City, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1299 (2016) (conducting
comparative analysis of P2P economy regulation in the U.S. and Europe).
22
See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1435 (citing STEVEN HILL, RAW DEAL: HOW THE “UBER
ECONOMY” AND RUNAWAY CAPITALISM ARE SCREWING AMERICAN WORKERS 122 (2015));
Jacob Davidson, Uber Reveals How Much Its Drivers Really Earn . . . Sort of, TIME (Jan. 22,
2015), http://time.com/money/3678389/uber-drivers-wages/; see also AMY LEVIN,
BENENSON STRATEGY GRP., THE DRIVER ROADMAP: WHERE UBER DRIVER-PARTNERS HAVE
BEEN, AND WHERE THEY’RE GOING 3 (2014), https://newsroom.uber.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/BSG_Uber_Report.pdf (noting, in study commissioned by Uber,
that just over half of Uber drivers drove on a part-time basis).
23
See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1435.
24
See id.; LEVIN, supra note 22, at 5 (finding, in study commissioned by Uber, that 55%
of UberBLACK drivers, representing 18% of total Uber drivers, drive more than 30 hours
per week); see also infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text.
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for providers.25 For example, the amplified opportunities for travelers to
stay in a local resident’s apartment allow those visitors to experience the
destination from that resident’s perspective.26 Likewise, for workers using
increased excess capacity, the on-demand economy offers the option to
work part time in a flexible setting.27 Conversely, while traditional
activities created by on-demand platforms can extend choice, they can also
result in reduction of valuable choice by eliminating the availability of
traditional services and jobs.28 For instance, the accessibility of traditional
lower-end hotels may be endangered by unfair competition from those who
offer their units for rent full-time but do not have to abide by the regulation
of such facilities (and can offer their units for a lower price).29
Correspondingly, people’s opportunities to find a full-time job, with all the
benefits and protections that accompany it, get scarcer when similar work is
offered by providers who do not get similar protections—and thus proffer
the same job at a cheaper price.30
Second, transactions in increased utilization produce fewer negative
externalities than on-demand activities that do not leverage excess capacity.
For instance, temporarily renting one’s property via Home Away or Airbnb
creates some negative externalities. As examples: unfamiliar people in the
common area, nuisances, and pressures on shared utilities such as parking.31
But activity that does not utilize excess capacity, such as renting a property
the entire year on a short-term basis, is likely to intensify the negative
externalities.32 It can result in housing shortages, housing price increases,

25

See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1413–16, 1434–35.
Roberta A. Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, Airbnb: A Case Study in Occupancy
Regulation and Taxation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 103, 105 (2015) (“One of the
primary benefits that it provides is that it allows guests to ʻlive like a local’ and explore
neighborhoods that do not typically cater to tourists, both by providing accommodations in a
wide variety of locales and by connecting visitors with local residents.”).
27
Aloni, supra note 15, at 1435 (citing HILL, supra note 22, at 122; Davidson, supra
note 22).
28
See id. at 1437 (citing Lauren Weber, One in Three U.S. Workers Is a Freelancer,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/atwork/2014/09/04/one-in-three-u-sworkers-is-a-freelancer/).
29
See id. at 1417 (citing Georgios Zervas, Davide Prosperio & John Byers, The Rise of
the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry, 30 (Boston U.
Sch. Mgmt. Research, Working Paper No. 2013-16), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2366898).
30
See infra notes 137–145 and accompanying text.
31
See Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147, 192–93 (2016) (discussing “Good Neighbor Regulations” aimed at
alleviating noise, parking, and trash concerns).
32
See infra notes 153–172 and accompanying text.
26
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decline in revenue from hotel taxes, and collapse of some hotels, to name a
few of the negative externalities.
The challenge for regulation of the on-demand economy, I contend, is in
crafting rules that will capture this distinction. Regulation that treats the
two categories differently will impose more rigorous (classic) rules of
compliance when one does not leverage excess capacity, and an easy-toadminister regime, with light regulation, for activity in underutilized goods
or time, that recognizes the particular value and nature of these activities.
In this Article, I offer basic principles for how to capture (by regulation)
which activities operate in increased utilization of excess capacity and what
the basic principles of such regulations should be.
The Article proceeds in the following way: Part I demonstrates that the
distinction between work in increased idle capacity and traditional work is
significant in terms of presentation in the on-demand economy and cuts
across different industries of the on-demand economy. Part II contends that
the two activities have different societal and economic impacts: increased
utilization produces more choice and fewer negative externalities, while
traditional work can result in loss of valuable options and produce more
negative externalities. Part III lays out the basic principles of regulation for
the on-demand economy, based on this distinction, and evaluates laws that
have embraced these principles.
I.

THE SPECTRUM OF WORK IN INCREASED UTILIZATION

The growth of the on-demand economy has raised significant regulatory
dilemmas for lawmakers around the world.33 On one side, some
consumers, scholars, and lobbyists, rooting for the on-demand firms, have
asked lawmakers to limit their intervention and let the innovation flourish.34
On the other side, incumbents, labor rights advocates, and communities
affected by on-demand activities request lawmakers to constrain some of
the harms inflicted by the rise of this model.35
33

See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1400.
See, e.g., Arun Sundararajan, Why the Government Doesn’t Need to Regulate the
Sharing Economy, WIRED (Oct. 22, 2012, 1:45 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/10/fromairbnb-to-coursera-why-the-government-shouldnt-regulate-the-sharing-economy/
(“By
making both product and trader quality instantly transparent, [the self-regulatory transaction
feedback] approach reduces the risks that often lead to market failure [and] provides a first
digital safeguard against much of what regulators aim to protect consumers from. After all,
profit is a much more powerful driver for quality than regulatory compliance.”).
35
See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1427–29 (describing the different approaches for
regulation of the on-demand economy); Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of Platform
Capitalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 309, 316 (2016) (analyzing the competing narratives
towards the on-demand economy).
34
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Within this debate, the role that work in increased excess capacity
occupies in the on-demand economy takes on a special significance.
Scholars, commentators, and the on-demand firms themselves often base
many of their arguments against regulatory requirements on the premise
that the model is characterized primarily by transactions in increased excess
capacity.36 For example, in response to a court ruling37 that found a New
York City short-term rental, facilitated by Airbnb, illegal, Airbnb proffered:
It is time to fix this law and protect hosts who occasionally rent out their own
homes. Eighty-seven percent of Airbnb hosts in New York list just a home
they live in—they are average New Yorkers trying to make ends meet, not
38
illegal hotels that should be subject to the 2010 law.

And Uber stated, in court filings concerning the classification of its
workers, that the firm “merely provides a platform for people who own
vehicles to leverage their skills and personal assets and connect with other
people looking to pay for those skills and assets.”39
The claim that most suppliers in the on-demand economy use their
increased excess capacity is critical to the argument in support of the ondemand economy because it distinguishes the on-demand market from the
traditional market. Thus, it should free the on-demand firms from
regulations that are tailored for conventional industries. If workers are only
maximizing their assets and time, the argument goes, they are different
from incumbents who work with designated capital and as full-time
36

See, e.g., Andrew T. Bond, An App for That: Local Governments and the Rise of the
Sharing Economy, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 77, 78 (2015) (“The sharing economy is
a microeconomic system built around the utilization of unused human and physical
resources.”); Timothy Doescher, How Congress Can Clear the Road for Uber, Lyft, and the
Gig Economy, THE DAILY SIGNAL (Oct. 27, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/
2016/10/27/how-congress-can-clear-the-road-for-uber-lyft-and-the-gig-economy/ (arguing
that the benefit of the gig economy is grounded in flexibility and that “[o]ne fact . . . may
explain this: over half of the drivers surveyed are part-time drivers working other jobs.”);
Hugo Martin, Big Chunk of Airbnb’s Revenue Comes from Year-Round Rentals, Study
Finds, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016, 11:16 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-airbnbhotels-20160120-story.html (Responding to a report commissioned by the American Hotel
and Lodging Association, which found that multi-unit operators are responsible for a third of
Airbnb’s revenue, the company stated, “This report uses misleading data to make false
claims and attack middle class families who share their homes and use the money they earn
to pay the bills.”).
37
See City of New York v. Carrey, Nos. 13006002 and 1300736 (N.Y.C. Envtl. Control
Bd. May 9, 2013), https://www.scribd.com/document/142650911/Decision-and-Order-forNOV-35006622J.
38
See Vacation Rental Site Airbnb Ruled Illegal in New York City, FOX NEWS (May 21,
2013), http://www.foxnews.com/travel/2013/05/21/airbnb-illegal-in-new-york-city.html.
39
Salovitz v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. A-14-CV-823-LY, 2014 WL 5318031, at *1 (W.D.
Tex. Oct. 16, 2014).
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employees. Put differently, the work of the on-demand market is not one
that replaces or competes with the work of incumbents; rather, it is a new
market, occupied by microearners.40 The result is a model that increases
options for consumers and workers, giving them the opportunity to work in
small gigs to make some supplemental income. It is, essentially, a “gig
economy”: a small-scale economy of people who monetize their
underutilized time, skills, and goods.41 Conversely, if this market is
populated by incumbent-like transactions, then it calls for regulation more
akin to the traditional paradigm. Hence, proving that the on-demand
economy truly is a small-scale, gig economy that creates new markets and
extended options is essential to the argument that the on-demand economy
should not be governed by traditional regulation.
Much of the data regarding the on-demand economy are debatable, and
some of them are funded or provided directly by interested parties.42 Yet,
despite this limitation, the data show a clear picture: an immense portion of
the on-demand economy is comprised of work done that is—i.e., work that
is based on utilization of idle capacity.43 Simultaneously, a large segment
of that economy is not based on increased utilization but is comprised of
full-time workers sometimes using designated capital: goods that are used
primarily for this purpose.44 This fragment of the on-demand economy is
40

Cf. Lobel, supra note 14, at 93 (“[P]art of the value produced by the platform lies
in its differentiation from traditional, offline exchanges. In other words, it reveals how
the platform economy is not simply competing efficiently over the same markets of
regulated industries but also constituting new markets, norms, and behaviors.”).
41
See Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government Law:
The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 901, 925 (2015)
(“[T]he rise of sharing firms as replacements for traditional, full-time jobs leads some
to lament the rising ‘gig economy’ as a wealth transfer from workers to capital, shifting
risk from employers to workers. Sharing firms resist this claim, arguing their employees
. . . are given supplementary income that would otherwise be unavailable.”).
42
See, e.g., LEVIN, supra note 22 (touting benefits of driving for Uber based on driver
surveys in study funded by Uber); JOHN W. O’NEILL & YUXIA OUYANG, AM. HOTEL &
LODGING ASS’N, FROM AIR MATTRESSES TO UNREGULATED BUSINESS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
OTHER SIDE OF AIRBNB (2016), https://www.ahla.com/sites/default/files/2016-10/
Airbnb_Analysis_September_2016.pdf (criticizing Airbnb in study funded by the American
Hotel and Lodging Association).
43
See LEVIN, supra note 22, at 5 (finding that Uber was rarely a sole source of income);
O’NEILL & OUYANG, supra note 42, at 5, 7–8 (finding that only “26% of Airbnb’s revenue is
derived from . . . full-time hosts” and comparing full-time hosts to all hosts using Airbnb’s
platform).
44
See LEVIN, supra note 22, at 5 (“62% of people who lease/finance their car use Uber
to help with car payments”); O’NEILL & OUYANG, supra note 42, at 5, 7–8 (finding that “[a]
growing number of hosts are using the Airbnb platform to operate full-time businesses” and
noting that full-time operators “represented only 3.5% of operators, but generated 26.0% of
revenue”).
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not only large in terms of number of participants and transactions but also
yields a vast part of the revenue of the on-demand firms.45 And despite
rhetoric that emphasizes the excess-capacity aspect, work without excess
utilization is sometimes even encouraged by the on-demand firms
themselves.46
I will begin with the data about the short-term on-demand rental market.
To distinguish between lessors who use their underutilized assets and those
who use designated capital, I delve into data about the number of lessors
who have more than one unit posted on on-demand platforms or whose unit
is available for an entire year for short-term rental. The principle is that
posting a unit as available for a period of more than a few months for shortterm rentals indicates that it is for commercial use, rather than for incidental
use in capitalizing idle capacity.
A study, run by the Penn State University School of Hospitality
Management and funded by the American Hotel and Lodging Association,
examined the lessors who posted properties on Airbnb in fourteen big
United States metropolitan areas, from October 2014 to September 2015.47
The study divided “hosts” (lessors) into three categories: those who offered
an entire unit for a short time during the year, those who offered a unit for
the entire year, and those who had two or more units on the platform.48 The
results demonstrate that those who work with designated capital, although
the minority, are consistently present across all of the cities and are
responsible for massive revenues for Airbnb. The study found that 2,772
full-time operators (those who made their unit or units available more than
360 days a year) constitute 3.5% of the total lessors.49 While this may seem
like a small number, the revenue that Airbnb derived from these full-time
operators was enormous. In the period studied, they yielded $347,479,616
for Airbnb, which constitutes 26% of Airbnb’s total revenue in those
locations during that period.50 Further, the study found that lessors who
rented two or more units for any amount of time constituted 16.2% of all
operators.51 Finally, mega-operators—defined by the study as hosts who
rent more than three units (for any amount of time)—constituted 6.5% of
the hosts and yielded 24.6% of Airbnb’s revenue, or $328,299,944, in those
cities during that period.52
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

See notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
See notes 221–223 and accompanying text.
O’NEILL & OUYANG, supra note 42.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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Further, looking at data from a few specific cities (not included in the
above study) provides a more nuanced picture that confirms the same
conclusions.53 For example, in Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, in March 2017, there
were 1,519 active hosts.54 Of these, 1,000 had one unit, 238 had two, 88
had three, 57 had four, and 117 had five or more.55 Again, most lessors had
one unit; but around one third were multi-unit operators of different
degrees.56 Further, of the 3,358 rentals available in 2016, 33% were
available for ten to twelve months; 20.8%, for seven to nine months; and
only 17.4%, for one to three months.57 Thus, this smaller-scale data from
Honolulu ratifies the distinction between commercial use and increased
usage of excess capacity.
The data about short-term rentals via various on-line on-demand
platforms in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, are the most nuanced
and comprehensive. The data are presented in a report submitted to the
Standing Committee on Policy and Strategic Priorities (in the city of
Vancouver) for consideration of new regulations of short-term rentals.58
The report reviewed the number of whole-unit listings active in 2015.59
The data show that 43% of whole-unit listings in 2015 were rented on a
nightly basis for fewer than thirty days that year, 19% were available
between thirty-one to sixty days, and 12% were available between sixty-one
to ninety days.60 Conversely, 4% of entire units were available for more
than nine months, and 8% were available for six to nine months.61
53

See generally Dayne Lee, How Airbnb Short-Term Rentals Exacerbate Los Angeles’s
Affordable Housing Crisis: Analysis and Policy Recommendations, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 229 (2016). Lee noted:
In practice, 64% of Airbnb listings in Los Angeles are for [short-term rentals] of units
that are never occupied by their owners or leaseholders, and operate year-round
essentially as independent, unlicensed hotel rooms. Chances are, an apartment booked
through the service is managed by a full-time investor or company that also owns or
leases dozens of other Airbnb listings.
Id. at 234.
54
Honolulu, Hawaii—Airbnb Data and Analytics, AIRDNA, https://www.airdna.co/
city/us/hawaii/honolulu (last visited Mar. 1, 2017). Note that the data presented on this
website are aggregated and updated daily. See Airdna Data Methodology, AIRDNA,
https://www.airdna.co/services/datafeed.
55
Honolulu, Hawaii—Airbnb Data and Analytics, AIRDNA, https://www.airdna.co/
city/us/hawaii/honolulu (last visited Mar. 1, 2017).
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
KAYE KRISHNA, CITY OF VANCOUVER, REGULATING SHORT-TERM RENTALS IN
VANCOUVER (2016), http://council.vancouver.ca/20161005/documents/pspc1c.pdf.
59
Id. at 5, 29.
60
Id. at 5–6.
61
Id.
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The housing data, therefore, show consistently that the use of on-demand
rental platforms varies with respect to the extent of underutilization. The
majority of properties are offered by lessors who use the increased excess
capacity of their principal residency, while a substantial minority of lessors
use these platforms to rent their properties not based on increased
utilization but as a commercial use.
When it comes to the on-demand transportation arena, there are no
available data on the number of drivers who use their private car
(designated for leisure) and monetize it for commercial use versus those
who use a car designated primarily for commercial use. However,
anecdotal evidence shows that a nontrivial number of drivers use a car that
they bought or rented for the primary purpose of driving passengers.62
Uber, the world’s largest on-demand transportation company, has programs
helping drivers to rent, lease, or buy a car.63 Uber’s Xchange leasing
program enables drivers with insufficient (or no) credit to lease a car,64
without mileage restrictions, and includes maintenance of the vehicle.65
Similarly, Lyft, Uber’s main competitor, maintains the Express Drive
Rental Car Program, which helps its drivers to rent a car.66 The rental’s
price depends on the number of hours the driver works for Lyft: the greater
the hours, the cheaper the rental price.67
Beyond the increased utilization of the goods used, sellers in the ondemand economy can also capitalize on their free hours. Thus, the
distinction here is between those who use their underutilized labor or
skills—by working for on-demand firms part time and selling hours that are
not available for their full-time job—and those who work full time for ondemand platforms, just like incumbents do. One way to discern the scale of
this distinction (or, more accurately, the spectrum) is through the worker’s
reliance on the income she makes from her work for the platforms.

62

See Nicole Dieker, Where do Uber and Lyft Drivers Get Their Cars? They Rent Them
From Another Startup, BILLFOLD (Apr. 13, 2015), https://thebillfold.com/where-do-uberand-lyft-drivers-get-their-cars-they-rent-them-from-another-startup-8e6eb04dcac5.
63
Vehicle Solutions, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/vehicle-solutions/ (last visited
Mar. 7, 2017).
64
See Eric Newcomer & Olivia Zaleski, Inside Uber’s Auto-Lease Machine, Where
Almost
Anyone
Can
Get
a
Car,
BLOOMBERG
(May
31,
2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-31/inside-uber-s-auto-lease-machinewhere-almost-anyone-can-get-a-car.
65
See Harry Campbell, Uber Vehicle Marketplace, RIDESHARE GUY,
http://therideshareguy.com/uber-vehicle-marketplace/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
66
See Express Drive Rental Car Program, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/enus/articles/218196557-Express-Drive-Rental-Car-Program-#cost (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
67
Id.
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A study by Requests for Startups examined the level of income that
workers in the on-demand economy rely on.68 The authors surveyed
approximately 900 workers in seventy-eight on-demand firms, including
Airbnb, DoorDash, Homejoy, Thumbtack, Uber, Lyft, and TaskRabbit.69 It
found that 39% of such workers rely on this work for a quarter of their
income; 19% of workers, for 25–50%; 13% of workers, for 50–75%; and
29% of workers for 75–100% of their income.70
Other studies confirm the same result. A survey of approximately 600
Uber drivers, conducted in December 2014, found that almost 40% have no
other job, roughly 30% had another full-time job, and another 30% had
another part-time job.71 A McKinsey report found that 40% of Uber drivers
in the United States earn their primary living through the platform, but just
7% of those who rent properties on Airbnb rely on it as their primary source
of income.72 Thus, workers in the on-demand economy fall on a spectrum
of utilization of hours: some work part time, as a gig, while for a good
portion of workers—between 30% and 40%—the on-demand economy is
their main or only source of income.73
In conclusion, the on-demand economy shows a range of use predicated
on increased use of excess capacity. On one end of that range, some people
work intermittently, leveraging their personal capital to produce otherwise
unrealized income. At other end are those who exploit the on-demand
platform to commercialize use without leveraging their idle capacity.

68

See Jennifer Rossa, The Workers, BLOOMBERG BRIEF (June 15, 2015),
https://newsletters.briefs.bloomberg.com/document/4vz1acbgfrxz8uwan9/the-workersdemographics; Alison Griswold, Young Twentysomethings May Have a Leg Up in the 1099
Economy, SLATE (May 22, 2015, 6:49 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/
2015/05/22/_1099_economy_workforce_report_why_twentysomethings_may_have_a_leg_u
p.html.
69
See id.
70
See id.
71
See Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s
Driver-Partners in the United States 10 (Princeton Univ. Indust. Rel. Sec., Working Paper
No. 587, 2015) (describing LEVIN, supra note 22, a survey conducted by the Benenson
Survey Group per Uber’s request).
72
See JAMES BUGHIN ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., INDEPENDENT WORK: CHOICE,
NECESSITY, AND THE GIG ECONOMY 61 (2016), http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/
McKinsey/Global%20Themes/Employment%20and%20Growth/Independent%20work%20
Choice%20necessity%20and%20the%20gig%20economy/Independent-Work-Choicenecessity-and-the-gig-economy-Full-report.ashx.
73
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THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WORK IN EXCESS
CAPACITY

So far I have shown that activities in the on-demand economy fall on a
spectrum based on the level of use or non-use of increased utilization of
good, time, or skills. This Section investigates the financial and societal
consequences that activities on each side of the spectrum create. Part A
explores the different influences that each activity has on expansion of
choice to consumers and providers. Part B analyzes the other negative and
positive externalities that each activity produces.
A.

Increased Utilization as a Choice-Enhancing Mechanism

Viewed through the prism of choice, the main value of the on-demand
economy is expanding the range of work options that revolve around
increased use of excess capacity. As I explain below, while the ability to
work through using one’s excess skills or property has long existed, the ondemand economy makes such work more readily offered, available, and
used. At the same time, work that is situated on the other end of the
spectrum of increased utilization can result, and in fact has resulted, in
decreased choice of other valuable options.
Choice is a central concept in a liberal democracy.74 Choice is closely
associated with autonomy because it allows people to self-determine the
course of their lives.75 Human beings know best what their preferences are
and are thus best situated to make their own choices.76 As stated famously
by John Stuart Mill, “The human faculties of perception, judgment,
discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are
exercised only in making a choice.”77 Other philosophers have expanded
on the importance of choice because “autonomous individuals shape their
lives on their own terms and this self-creative activity is exercised primarily
through choice.”78 Thus, generally, facilitating choice is one of the main
responsibilities of lawmakers in a liberal state.79
The on-demand economy, especially when employed by casual sellers,
contributes to the expansion of choice. Undoubtedly, the practice of
74
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CHOOSING NOT TO CHOOSE: UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE OF
CHOICE X (2015).
75
See id.
76
See id.
77
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 65 (Emery Neff ed., 1926).
78
STEVEN LECCE, AGAINST PERFECTIONISM: DEFENDING LIBERAL NEUTRALITY 106
(2008) (analyzing Joseph Raz’s approach to autonomy and choice).
79
See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1431–33.
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maximizing otherwise underutilized goods and time existed long before the
on-demand economy.80 Working as a freelance in a flexible setting, in
small gigs, and as an “independent contractor” predated the on-demand
economy.81 Renting properties for short periods while away also preceded
the on-demand economy but was done through more conventional and less
efficient methods, such as publishing an ad in a newspaper.82 Carpooling
and other forms of collaborative transportation are also far from new.83
Yet, the on-demand economy intensifies the opportunities to maximize
underutilized goods and time.
The introduction of simple-to-use
technology offers a greater supply of otherwise wasted capital and labor
because more people can now easily offer their idle capacity for sale.84
These platforms reduce the expense of creating such transactions and
enable the sale of one’s merchantability with little or no cost. In so doing,
the on-demand economy eases barriers to entry into markets that were
previously reserved primarily for professionals.85 Simultaneously, the ondemand economy increases choice and supply “by allowing users to slice
up time and space into smaller units.”86 That is, by facilitating the
connection between peers, the on-demand economy enables suppliers to sell
smaller portions of their time and goods in an efficient manner.
Accordingly, the on-demand economy “reduces barriers to entry into
transactions, allows non-expert participants to exchange services and goods
and to sell smaller segments of their labor, and therefore enables another
layer of market choice.”87 The result is more valuable choices for
consumers and workers alike.
For consumers, the on-demand economy is beneficial in accommodating
different types of values and preferences.88 Individuals perceive what is
important in diverse ways, and the excess-capacity model supports
increased diversity of choices by making options more easily accessible.89
80

See Lobel, supra note 14, at 131.
See id. (“The rise of the contingent workforce precedes the rise of the platform. The
contingent workforce now constitutes more than one-third of all employees with predictions
that it will rise to nearly half of the workforce by 2020.”).
82
See HILL, supra note 22, at 4–8.
83
See, e.g., Jeff Cozza, The History of Carpooling, from Jitneys to Ridesharing,
SHAREABLE (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.shareable.net/blog/the-history-of-carpooling-fromjitneys-to-ridesharing.
84
See Lobel, supra note 14, at 108 (“[S]upply is increased by adding under-utilized
assets into the market and, in turn, costs are reduced.”).
85
See id. at 110–11.
86
See id. at 108.
87
See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1410.
88
See id. at 1413–14.
89
See Lobel, supra note 14, at 113–14 (“Consumers convey a preference for a different
81

2017 / CAPTURING EXCESS IN THE ON DEMAND ECONOMY

329

Hence, if a consumer prefers staying at a unit offered by a resident and
viewing the location from the eye of a local, the on-demand platforms
enable this. But if one is more risk-averse and would like to avoid any
hazard (such as finding that the unit is different from what was described,
or located in a less favorable part of the city), a hotel may be a better
option. Some consumers care more about hygiene and would prefer to stay
at a hotel for that reason.90 Some passengers show a preference for
knowing the exact time that their Lyft driver will arrive, while others may
not have a smartphone, or prefer to pay cash for the transaction (which is
not an option with Uber or Lyft), or may be in a rush—so favor catching a
taxi on the street.91 Some consumers view Uber as safer, while other view
taxis as safer; some care more about the price than others.92 Indeed, in a
survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers, 32% of respondents
indicated that “more choice in the marketplace” is a strong selling point for
on-demand transportation platforms.93 The bottom line is that the ondemand economy offers consumers another layer of market choice that fits
their particular preferences.
For providers, the on-demand economy offers the opportunity to work in
a flexible framework, in small gigs, to capitalize on their unused time in
order to earn some supplementary income.94 In reducing barriers to
entrance into industries, the on-demand economy also allows
nonprofessional players to leverage their unused skills—from driving to
cooking—for the purpose of making extra money.95
kind of market exchange.”).
90
See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1414 (citing PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONSUMER
INTELLIGENCE SERIES: THE SHARING ECONOMY 20 (2015), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/
industry/entertainment-media/publications/consumer-intelligence-series/assets/pwc-cissharing-economy.pdf).
91
See Larry Magid, Ride Sharing is Great As Long As We Address Downsides, THE
MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 23, 2017, 9:07 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/02/23/ridesharing-is-great-as-long-as-we-address-downsides (“The reason I worry about the taxi
industry is that there are times when a taxi is a better choice than a ride-hailing service,
especially if you’re in a hurry and there’s one nearby.”).
92
See Anthony Neal Macri, #QuickTapLive Survey: Three Quarters of Millenials
Prefer Uber, Despite Damaging Media Reports, QUICKTAPSURVEY BLOG (Jan. 29, 2016),
http://www.quicktapsurvey.com/blog/2016/01/29/uber-vs-taxi/
(surveying
consumers’
reasons to pick Uber over a taxi).
93
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 90, at 20.
94
See Lobel, supra note 14, at 108 (explaining that many workers in the on-demand
economy “seek to fill up their free time and leverage their flexibility to earn extra income. In
other words, the platform resurrects dormant capital—be it tangible products or
human capital.”); Aloni, supra note 15, at 1435.
95
See Lobel, supra note 14, at 108; Aloni, supra note 15, at 1435 (“The model reduces
barriers to entering markets previously reserved to those whose full-time work or expertise,
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A study conducted by McKinsey Global Institute and published in
October 2016 examines several aspects of independent contractors across
six countries, including the United States.96 The study was not limited to
workers in the on-demand economy, as freelancers who work for ondemand platforms constituted 15% of the workers surveyed.97 It found that
a significant proportion of all casual workers—approximately 70%—were
freelancers by choice, rather than because they were unable to find a fulltime alternative.98 This segment of workers emphasized the degree of
flexibility and autonomy that this job framework offers them.99 Thus, the
report elaborates: “Many earners strongly prefer the autonomy and
flexibility of independent work. They value being their own boss, setting
their own hours to some extent, and focusing on work that interests them
[. . .] The Uber driver can fit his hours around a class schedule or family
priorities.”100 When it came to workers in the on-demand economy, the
report found that, in the United States, 87% of workers for this industry
chose this working pattern rather than selecting it as a necessity (because
they could not find a different type of job).101 Other data, provided by
Uber, indicate that Uber drivers appreciate the flexibility in their work.
Asked how they decide when to work, 40% of drivers answered that it
depends on what else is on their schedule.102
At the same time, the impact of the on-demand economy can also
translate into reduced choice for consumers and workers. As a result of the
competition posed by the on-demand industries, some traditional
(conventional) services that are not provided via platforms are at risk of
becoming scarcer or disappearing altogether. This is especially true when
the on-demand economy promotes suppliers who work commercially (not
in utilization of idle capacity). Without regulation that distinguishes these
types of activities, the alternatives that incumbents offer cannot withstand
the competition, and reduction of such services has resulted.
For instance, one traditional service that may be endangered is traditional
taxicabs. The entrance of the Transportation Network Companies (“TNC,”
essentially the on-demand transportation companies) into the market has led
to a considerable contraction of the number of taxicab rides. The UCLA
Labor Center studied the economic implications for the taxi industry in Los
for the most part, is the provision of such services.”).
96
BUGHIN ET AL., supra note 72, at 1.
97
Id. at 12.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 45.
101
Id. at 59.
102
LEVIN, supra note 22, at 2.
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Angeles and documented how the entrance of Lyft and Uber gave rise to
significant shrinkage in the number of rides.103 It found that, between 2013
and 2014, taxi ridership dropped by 18%, a total of 1.4 million fewer trips
than the previous year.104 This number is likely bigger now as, at the time
of the study, Lyft and Uber were not allowed to pick up passengers from
LAX airport, a route that constituted a large source of rides exclusively for
taxicabs.105 In Seattle, after Uber and Lyft became authorized to pick up
passengers from the airport, every month showed a further decline in the
number of taxi rides: from –9.5% in June 2016 to –16.6% in August
2016.106 In Arlington, Virginia, dispatched cab trips saw a steep reduction
in just two years: falling from 2.6 million annually to 1.7 million annually
between 2013 and 2015.107 The resultant financial struggles have forced
cab companies to fire workers, file for bankruptcy, and even close entirely,
making taxi services less available to the general public in some regions.108
The decreased availability of traditional services constitutes a problem
for consumers who need greater protections. For instance, traditional
taxicabs are an important choice for some consumers, especially minorities.
This is because people who are part of minority groups may feel safer
taking a traditional taxi or find it harder to get rides through on-demand
103

SABA WAHEED ET AL., UCLA LABOR CENT., RIDESHARING OR RIDESTEALING?
CHANGES IN TAXI RIDERSHIP AND REVENUE IN LOS ANGELES 2009–2014 (2015),
http://www.labor.ucla.edu/downloads/policy-brief-ridesharing-or-ridestealing/.
104
Id. at 2.
105
Id. (“The Los Angeles airport is still restricted to TNCs from doing business on the
premises, but this month the Los Angeles World Airport (LAWA) Commissioners are
expected to vote to lift a ban on TNCs at LAX.”); see also Laura J. Nelson & Katie
Shepherd, LAX Becomes Largest U.S. Airport to Allow Uber, Lyft Pickups, L.A. TIMES (July
16,
2015),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-uber-legal-lax-20150716story.html.
106
See Sara Bernard, Uber and the Uncertain Future of Taxis at the Airport, SEATTLE
WEEKLY (Sept. 28, 2016, 1:30 AM), http://www.seattleweekly.com/news/uber-and-theuncertain-future-of-taxis-at-the-airport/.
107
See Uber and Lyft are Killing Arlington’s Taxi Business, ARL NOW (July 13, 2016,
2:30 PM), https://www.arlnow.com/2016/07/13/uber-and-lyft-are-killing-arlingtons-taxibusiness/.
108
In 2016, San Francisco’s biggest taxi company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. See
In re Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc., No. 3:16-bk-30063 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2016); see also
Kate Rogers, Uber, Lyft Put Pressure on Taxi Companies, CNBC (Jan. 26, 2016, 1:10 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/26/uber-lyft-put-pressure-on-taxi-companies.html.
Cab
company closures have occurred nationwide, including in Santa Ana, California, and
Albuquerque, New Mexico. See Lauren Williams, Fare Fallout: Uber, Lyft, and Rising
Costs Force Santa Ana Taxi Firm to Close, ORANGE CTY. REG. (Apr. 6, 2016, 7:54 AM),
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/taxi-710936-county-uber.html;
Chris
Guardaro,
Albuquerque Cab Company Closes, Lays Off 70 Employees at Once, KOAT (Mar. 6, 2017,
10:31 PM), http://www.koat.com/article/video-cab-company-out-of-business/9099591.
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transportation companies. Researchers from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology recently tested whether being perceived as an African
American passenger makes it harder to get a ride with Lyft and Uber.109 In
Seattle, the study found that African American passengers had to wait
longer before booking a ride via Uber—up to a 35% increase in waiting
time compared with their white counterparts.110 In Boston, the study used
passengers with African American–sounding names and found that Uber
drivers cancelled rides more than twice as frequently as they cancelled rides
for passengers with white-sounding names.111
No doubt, racial
discrimination by traditional taxi drivers is a familiar and well-established
fact, which occurs on a regular basis.112 However, while a host of federal
and state laws forbid traditional taxicabs from discriminating based on
race,113 the applicability of these laws to the on-demand drivers, and firms
themselves, is a more contested question.114
Further, people with disabilities have documented cases in which Uber
drivers refused to take them, either because the latter had service animals or
used a wheelchair.115 In a lawsuit filed by the National Federation of the
109

See Yanbo Ge et al., Racial and Gender Discrimination in Transportation Network
Companies (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22776, 2016),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22776.
110
Id. at 2.
111
Id. at 1–2.
112
See, e.g., THE EQUAL RIGHTS CENTER, SERVICE DENIED: RESPONDING TO TAXICAB
DISCRIMINATION IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA i (2003), https://equalrightscenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/taxicab_report.pdf (“Each year, thousands of minority residents and visitors
are unable to hail a taxicab in the District of Columbia because of the color of their skin or
because they want to go to a predominantly African-American neighborhood.”); Aaron
Belzer & Nancy Leong, The New Public Accommodations, 105 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming
2017)
(manuscript
at
26)
(on
file
with
SSRN),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2687486 (“Both research and anecdotal
evidence suggest that non-white people have more difficulty hailing taxi cabs.”).
113
See, e.g., Mitchell v. DCX, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 33, 44 (D.D.C. 2003) (alleging racial
discrimination by a taxi company under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Belzer & Leong, supra note 112,
at 36 (stating that many commentators have assumed that taxi cabs are public
accommodations and thus answerable to federal laws, while others have argued that taxi
cabs are not bound, although various state laws consider taxi rides “public
accommodation”).
114
See, e.g., Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85,
95 (2015) (“Uber’s exact duties under federal and state civil rights laws are not yet clear.”).
115
See Jason Marker, Wheelchair Using Passenger Films Uber Driver Refusing to Pick
Him Up, AUTO BLOG (Jan. 10, 2017, 11:41 AM), http://www.autoblog.com/2017/01/10/
wheelchair-using-passenger-films-uber-driver-refusing-to-pick-hi/ (describing Uber driver’s
refusal to pick up wheelchair-bound passenger after stating that “[d]isabled people need
disabled car(s)”); Nina Strochlic, Uber: Disability Laws Don’t Apply to Us, DAILY BEAST
(May 21, 2015, 2:15 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/21/uber-
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Blind of California, Uber argued that the Americans with Disabilities Act
does not apply to them.116 While Uber and Lyft have recently started to
offer services that can accommodate people who rely on wheelchairs,
consumers have complained that these services are rarely available.117
Finally, some people who feel more vulnerable may believe that they are
safer taking taxis than using an on-demand platform for their rides. While
there is no definitive indication that taxis are safer than TNCs, or that many
people perceive taxis as safer, anecdotal evidence explains why individuals
may feel safer using taxis; thus, publicized reports in which TNC drivers
attacked, harassed, or refused to pick up transgender individuals may deter
some from choosing this option.118 This hesitation may be bolstered on
account of a few widely reported incidents of TNC drivers who raped or
sexually assaulted passengers,119 as well as by the TNC firms’ refusal to
fingerprint their drivers as taxi drivers do.120 The bottom line is that, for
some people, the availability of traditional taxicabs is still an essential
option because the on-demand economy alternative is viewed as more
risky.
disability-laws-don-t-apply-to-us.html (describing Uber driver’s refusal to pick up
wheelchair-bound passenger based on claim that wheelchair would not fit in driver’s trunk);
Hannah Wise, Mansfield Woman Says Uber Drivers Won’t Pick Her Up Because of Service
Dog, DALLAS NEWS (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/transportation/
2016/10/03/mansfield-woman-says-uber-drivers-pick-service-dog (describing passenger’s
experience hailing rides through Uber and Lyft with her service dog).
116
See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of California v. Uber Techs., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1073,
1082 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (claiming, inter alia, violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
in class action on behalf of blind Uber customers).
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See Heather Kelly, Uber’s Services for the Disabled Lack Actual Cars, CNN (May 3,
2016, 1:16 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/02/technology/uber-access/.
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Transphobic Post, THE DAILY DOT (Feb. 28, 2016), http://www.dailydot.com/irl/lyft-drivermonica-jones-location-facebook/ (describing trans activist Monica Jones’s experience with
transphobic Lyft driver); Raymond Rizzo, Uber Driver James Henneberg is “Bothered” by
the “Transgender Thing”; Refuses to be Paired with Gay Couple in Future; Admits to
Lying, E. NASHVILLE NEWS (Jan. 7, 2017), http://eastnashville.news/2017/01/uber-driverjames-henneberg-is-bothered-by-the-transgender-thing-refuses-to-be-paired-with-gaycouple-in-future-admits-to-lying/ (exposing Uber driver’s transphobic and homophobic
social media comments regarding interactions with passengers).
119
See Reported List of Incidents Involving Uber and Lyft, WHO’S DRIVING YOU?,
http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/rideshare-incidents (collecting data on number of reported
assaults by Uber and Lyft drivers) (last visited May 2, 2017).
120
In 2016, Uber CEO Travis Kalanick stated that Uber’s reliance on alternative
background-checking methods gives people with past, possibly unjustified, arrests a fair
opportunity to drive for the company. See Heather Kelly, Uber CEO Explains Why He
Thinks Fingerprinting Drivers is ‘Unjust,’ CNN (June 24, 2016, 12:28 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/23/technology/uber-travis-kalanick-ges-fingerprinting/.
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Relatedly, the short-term on-demand platforms may threaten the
existence of valuable options of traditional accommodations, such as lowerend hotels. Competition with the on-demand platform has endangered
lower-end hotels because the more luxurious hotels are more likely than
short-term on-demand rental platforms to attract businesspeople and
wealthier tourists.121 Indeed, a recent study concluded that Airbnb’s impact
on the hotel industry in Texas is unevenly distributed because Airbnb
affects mostly lower-end hotels, making them more vulnerable to economic
harm.122
Reduced options to stay in a less expensive hotel can have the most
serious impact on those who cannot afford the more luxurious options or
who find it harder to book a room through the on-demand economy housing
platforms. Some have good reasons to persist in using traditional services:
some individuals are more risk averse; others lack the technological access
required to book such stay; still others may face discrimination in finding a
room via on-demand platforms.123 A recent study found that prospective
Airbnb lessees with names perceived to be distinctively African American
were 16% less likely to succeed in booking a stay than users with identical
profiles but who had names that are considered distinctively white
names.124 For these consumers, the survival of traditional options can be
especially vital.
Finally, and importantly, another aspect in which the on-demand
economy decreases choice—particularly when work is not in utilization of
excess capacity—is in its effect on the number of long-term rentals
available on the housing market. Viewed through this lens, while
consumers may enjoy more choice when they travel, they may find it harder
to find a long-term rental to live in, in their own city (if they reside in a
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See Lobel, supra note 14, at 115 (“In general, Airbnb competes more directly with
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122
See Georgios Zervas, Davide Prosperio & John Byers, The Rise of the Sharing
Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry 30 (Boston U. Sch. Mgmt.
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See Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the
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location with a thriving short-term rental market).125 This is because of the
trend of converting long-term units to short-term rentals. This development
has led to further housing shortages and price increases in the long-term
rental market.
To understand this phenomenon and its consequences, it is first important
to recognize the financial incentive in taking an apartment off of the longterm rental market and renting it short term. Almost always, renting the
unit for short term yields considerable more money than renting it long
term.126 Take Honolulu, Hawaiʻi: according to AirDNA, a company that
provides analytics of Airbnb businesses—as a means to advise people
where it is best to invest in properties for Airbnb—the average monthly rent
of a one-bedroom (long-term rental) is around $1,300; the average Airbnb
monthly revenue from one bedroom is $2,800; and lessors who are at the
ninetieth percentile of Airbnb’s revenue in Honolulu (the most successful
lessors in the area) can earn as much as $4,550 a month.127 Thus, in
Honolulu, converting a unit from long term to short term, on average,
would yield more than double—and possibly triple, almost quadruple—the
lessor’s revenue. Honolulu is in no way unique: data from all other main
metropolitan cities reveal the incentive in taking apartments off the longterm market. In Vancouver, British Columbia, renting a one-bedroom unit
for nine to twelve days (depending on the area) would yield the same
revenue as a monthly long-term rental.128
Because of this level of monetary incentive, gradually, more rental
apartments are taken off the market, and their removal contributes to
housing shortages and rent surges.129 Particularly in tight markets,
reductions of available units are likely to increase rental prices.130 This
impact is already noticeable in several cities. In October 2014, the New
125

See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1449 (“[A nonintervention approach] increases choice for
some tourists and affords extra income for renters, but those limited benefits come at the
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126
See Lee, supra note 53, at 234 (“So long as a property owner or leaseholder can earn a
substantial premium from Airbnb rather than renting to city residents, there is an
overpowering incentive to ‘hotelize’ entire buildings . . . .”).
127
See Scott Shatford, The Best Places to Buy Airbnb Investment Property in America,
AIRDNA (Aug. 11, 2015), http://blog.airdna.co/most-profitable-airbnb-cities-in-america/.
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KRISHNA, supra note 58, at 8.
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See, e.g., Carolyn Said, The Airbnb Effect, S.F. CHRONICLE (July 12, 2015),
http://www.sfchronicle.com/airbnb-impact-san-francisco-2015/#1 (finding that in San
Francisco at least 350 entire homes listed on Airbnb appear to be full-time vacation
rentals—in a city “wracked by a housing crisis, where a typical year sees just 2,000 new
units added, a few hundred units off the market makes a significant dent”).
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See Lee, supra note 53, at 237 (“In tight housing markets with near-zero vacancy
rates, a sudden reduction in supply naturally increases rents, particularly because neither the
market nor the public sector can swiftly add to the housing stock.”).
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York Office of the Attorney General released a report about the impact of
Airbnb on housing availability in New York City.131 It found that over
4,600 units were available on Airbnb as short-term rentals for more than
three months and therefore were unavailable for long-term residents—and
that the number of such units is likely even larger.132 A more recent study,
commissioned by the Housing Conservation Coordinators and MFY Legal
Services, used the most rigorous method to measure the impact of Airbnb
on long-term rental availability in NYC. The study documented units that
they define as “impact listing”—meaning that the listings, in 2015, were (1)
an entire unit; (2) a regular short-term rental, meaning the unit was booked
for short periods more than once per month and had at least one nonbooked
day per month; and (3) commercial, meaning the unit was listed for at least
three months in the year by the lessor, who listed more than one unit on
Airbnb, or was listed for at least six months a year by the lessor, who listed
only one unit on Airbnb.133 These “impact units” are properties that are
most likely for commercial use, unavailable for long-term rent, and thus
have the strongest negative impact on housing availability.134 The study
found that, in 2015, nearly 16%—or 8,058 listings—of all Airbnb listings in
New York City fell under the definition of impact listings.135 Returning
these units to the long-term market, the report estimates, would increase
housing availability by 10%. Further, because the Airbnb market is most
active in Manhattan, releasing these units back to the market would increase
the number of vacant units for long-term rental in Manhattan by 21%.136
In a similar vein, the employment structure that on-demand companies
employ can also prompt a reduction of choices for workers, specifically for
traditional employment opportunities in which the worker is defined as an
“employee.” Most on-demand firms classify their workers as “independent
contractors.”137 This classification saves the firms large amounts of money,
131
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See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in
the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1686 (2016); see also Zenelaj v. Handybook,
Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (concerning a class-action lawsuit brought against
Handybook, a housecleaning on-demand platform, by its workers for misclassification as
independent workers).
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because they do not need to offer these workers various employment
protections such as reimbursement of work-related expenses, overtime
payment, employer contributions to unemployment insurance,138 and
minimum wages.139 As an example, according to one estimate, “Uber can
save up to thirty percent in payroll taxes simply by classifying its drivers as
nonemployees.”140
The expansion of the on-demand economy, especially when workers do
not provide only “gigs” but, rather, derive most of their income from this
work, can culminate in a decrease of traditional, protected positions. For
example, in the transportation sector, the entrance of Uber and Lyft into the
market precipitated a significant drop in the number of taxicab jobs.141 Not
all taxi drivers are defined as “employees”—even in the traditional-sector
taxi industry, some work as independent contractors.142 A worker’s
classification as “employee” versus “independent contractor” depends on
the level of control that the employer retains over the worker.143 But many
of them are classified as employees, making them recipients of a host of
benefits, as noted above—thus, such positions are now more difficult to
gain.
138

See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1073–74 (N.D. Cal. 2015). In that
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unemployment insurance.
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139
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142
See, e.g., NLRB. v. Friendly Cab Co., Inc., 512 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008)
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Appeals Bd., 277 Cal. Rptr. 434, 436–38 (finding that taxi drivers were “employees” for
workers’ compensation purposes).
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As stated, the McKinsey Global Institute assessed that 87% of workers in
the on-demand economy work by choice rather than due to an inability to
find other gainful employment.144 However, this means that 13% of
workers work in the on-demand economy because they cannot find fulltime stable employment. But a different study, which surveyed providers in
the on-demand economy, found that “41 percent say they prefer the security
and benefits of working for a traditional company even if it might mean less
flexibility.”145 Which is why the accurate number is a debatable question.
But there is no doubt that the rise of the on-demand economy—and
especially its lack of regulation with regard to employment rights—results
in the reduction of stable employment opportunities.
The reduction of choice for consumers and workers is correlated to the
spectrum of utilization players use in the on-demand economy. For
consumers, it may not matter if the product they buy derived from casual or
commercial work. But the consequences that stem from the magnitude of
commercial work can eventually mean less choice for consumers.
Infrequent casual work in increased excess capacity accordingly has less
impact on the reduction of choice. For providers, the distinction is more
obvious: as unregulated work in excess-in-disguise grows more common,
the fewer options exist for traditional, protected work. Hence, choice and
level of utilization of excess capacity are correlated.
B.

Other Negative Externalities

In addition to the expansion or reduction of choice, activities from
opposite ends of the utilization spectrum produce different levels of
negative externalities. Activities in increased excess capacity produce
fewer negative externalities, whereas commercial use without utilization of
excess capacity typically produces more negative externalities.
In the short-term on-demand rental market, the magnitude of negative
externalities attached to commercial use of short-term rentals is
noticeable.146 To be sure, casually renting a unit every once in a while can
produce some negative externalities, too, such as nuisance and safety
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concerns.147 Having strangers in a building can make the residents feel less
safe; it can create extra noise by people who come to vacation; it can also
generate some added pressure on shared resources—from recycling and
trash, to parking and elevators, to gym usage (where one exists).148
However, when one rents an apartment via platforms consistently and
commercially, the magnitude of these harms grows;149 e.g.,
from
occasionally seeing unfamiliar faces in the hallway and parking areas to
seeing different unfamiliar faces all the time, from intermittent noise to
more constant noise, and so on.
The use of short-term rentals that do not involve utilization of excess
space, in residences that are not designed to operate as hotels, intensifies
these setbacks. Indeed, in a survey conducted in Vancouver, British
Columbia, 42% of those questioned said that short-term rentals reduce
safety in buildings and neighborhoods, and 41% said that they increase
noise and property damage.150
Lara Williams, an author and freelance writer who lives in Manchester,
UK, describes the major inconvenience and noise she experienced from an
apartment adjacent to hers, which was converted to be a short-term rental
unit.151 She experienced loud noise, parties, music, and even “men
wrestling on the floor outside my flat, someone trying to kick in my door,
and fights that have left blood smears across the corridor walls.”152 Lara
recognizes the distinction between commercial use and renting short term
by increased utilization. She writes, “I had nothing against someone trying
to make a little extra cash over the weekend. It was when it became clear
the property was being entirely used for short-term rentals, and after my
second phone call to the police, that I started complaining.”153 This seems
to be a common view: many people agree that their neighbors should be
able to leverage their underutilized goods, but they do not want to live next
to what functions as a semi–hotel room.154
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What is more, the nuisance resulting from vast conversions to short-term
rentals in residential areas threatens to change the nature of entire
neighborhoods. In popular tourist destinations, which are very profitable
for operators of short-terms, residents report that the short-term market
facilitated through the platforms has promoted nuisance, noise, and feelings
of insecurity.155 People who live in residential areas have found themselves
neighboring with hotel-like operations. As described by a report written by
the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy:
In Venice [California], as many as 12.5 percent of all housing units have
become AirBnB units, all without public approval. There are 360 AirBnB
units per square mile in Venice and longtime residents who never intended to
live next to hotels now find themselves dealing with noise and safety concerns
156
that negatively impact their quality of life.

The ramifications of on-demand platforms on the availability of longterm rentals can also contribute to changes in the character of a community.
If an area is populated with apartments that are rented only short term,
when they are not booked these units remain empty.157 At the same time,
local residents cannot find homes—due to the housing shortage and
increase in prices—and have to leave the area.158 As described by a
resident of Marfa, Texas: “Instead of having someone live in that house
who’s contributing to the community, you’re turning the house into a place
that gets rented out a couple of times a month.”159
Another negative externality of short-term rentals via on-demand
platforms is reduction in revenue from transient occupancy tax (aka, hotel
tax).160 Hotel taxes are used in big cities to facilitate collaboration between
the city and the hotel industry.161 The hotel collects the taxes for the city or
state to use for infrastructure, such as convention centers and transportation,
that attracts tourism.162 Thus, when more visitors stay in short-term
155
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residences rather than hotels, the result is less revenue to the city.163 In
some municipalities this is no longer a problem, as Airbnb has started to
collect the tax for the city.164 In other municipalities, this is still a
problem.165 And regarding hotel tax, too, there is a difference between
increased use and commercial use. When a unit is rented full time, it is
likely to be in an area that is already highly attractive to tourists.166 The
implication is that a large number of visitors who use the infrastructures
funded by hotel taxes do not contribute to this use; conversely, the loss of
revenue from casual lessees is less significant because their number is
smaller. Further, when one rents an excess-capacity unit only rarely, it can
be located in areas that are further from “the tourist path” and thus bring
more economic activity to such areas (these are also generally areas that
receive less direct benefit from hotel tax revenue).167
The same holds true with regard to commercial use of TNCs: it is likely
to produce more negative externalities than increased-utilization driving
does.168 To be sure, work as a driver in increased utilization also produces
some negative externalities; the difference between the externalities that
commercial versus casual use creates lies in their magnitude.169 The
expansion of TNC services can increase the number of cars on the road and,
163
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therefore, create more air pollution and traffic congestion.170 This is
because, unlike with taxicabs, there is no cap on the number of automobiles
that TNCs use.171 Further, there is a risk that passengers may use public
transportation less frequently, because TNC services serve as an alternative
option to public transportation.172 And only infrequently do TNCs serve as
replacements for car ownership, so they do not decrease in significant ways
the number of cars on the street.173 They mainly serve as an alternative to
taxis.174 Indeed, there are some strong indications that the lower prices of
TNC rides generate greater numbers of rides than would otherwise exist
with traditional taxis.175 In NYC, there has been debate on the impact of
TNCs on traffic, with contradictory evidence produced by both sides. On
the one side, in January 2016, the Office of the Mayor published a longawaited report on the connection between TNCs and intensified traffic in
Manhattan.176 The report concluded that “E-dispatch is a contributor to
overall congestion, but did not drive the recent increase in congestion in the
CBD [Manhattan’s Central Business District].”177 This report, however,
170
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was criticized for its unclear methodology and lack of data about the way
conclusions were generated.178
Other accounts claim the opposite: a recent report concluded, “TNCs
accounted for the addition of 600 million miles of vehicular travel to the
city’s roadway network [between 2013 and 2016] . . . . exceed[ing] the total
mileage driven by yellow cabs in Manhattan.”179 This report, as well as
others, argues that the TNCs accrue more rides and numbers of vehicles on
the streets while they trim the number of rides in public transportation.180
Other data from San Francisco and London show similar consequences: a
swell in number of rides, a surge in traffic congestion, and concerns about
air quality as a result.181
Additional negative externalities may appear as more people work in
TNCs as super drivers. The growing number of untrained drivers can
increase the number of car accidents. In municipalities that charge a tax for
each taxi ride but have not enacted a similar duty on the TNCs, tax
revenues are reduced.
To conclude, the magnitude of work that is not based on increased use of
excess capacity does most of the job of producing more negative
extremities here. It does that by enlarging the number of transactions and
by making the type of work offered more comparable to that of traditional
offerings. As such, it threatens the rationales that existing regulations are
grounded in, like limiting the number of taxis on the road, increasing
revenues from tax collection, or controlling nuisances through zoning laws.
III.

PRINCIPLES OF REGULATORY APPROACH

Activities of the on-demand economy create different levels of negative
and positive externalities, often in correlation with their position on the
178
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spectrum of utilization.182 As such, apposite regulations should aim to
differentiate between the two types of activities and treat each with a
separate set of rules. This Section provides some basic principles of
regulation that embody this concept, while looking at municipalities that
have enacted policies incorporating some of these principles—successfully
and unsuccessfully.
The first principle involves capturing the distinction between work in
increased excess capacity and activity that is not based on increased
utilization. Namely, lawmakers should craft regulations that discern when
work in increased utilization transforms into an activity that is more akin to
traditional commercial work. Regulations, thus, should prevent incumbentlike providers from passing as increased-excess providers in order to evade
regulation governing the traditional sectors.
How can policymakers design rules to distinguish between activities that
derive from increased utilization and those that do not? When cataloging
different undertakings, lawmakers ought to look at two factors together: the
frequency of supply and the infrastructure used for the transaction. The
frequency denotes the number of transactions the provider is involved with
in a defined period. The more frequently that the supplier provides the
goods or services, the more likely that she is not working in increased
excess capacity. The other distinguishing factor for policymakers to focus
on is infrastructure: whether the goods are primarily designated for a
commercial purpose or only intermittently converted for commercial use.
If the provider uses her goods predominantly for her own leisure, and only
occasionally for commercial purposes, this indicates that she is selling idle
capacity.
The type of indicators that lawmakers can consider to pinpoint the
frequency of use and the function of the infrastructure depends on the type
of regulation at stake. For example, in determining the appropriate
employment classification of providers and the protections that workers
should get, the factors that lawmakers should contemplate include: the
number of hours the worker puts into the work, the portion of that worker’s
income derived from this work, the number of miles she drives over a
period of time, and the function of the vehicle (e.g., private versus rented
car). For short-term rentals, lawmakers should take into consideration the
number of transactions per year (the total nights per year that the provider
offers the unit on a short-term basis) and whether the provider is a principal
resident, because these factors indicate whether the provider uses her
property primarily for commercial purposes.
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See supra Part II.
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A few municipalities have commenced crafting and implementing
regulations that aim to distinguish between these different uses.183 While
the content of these rules are still open to debate and do not embed this
concept perfectly, they generally delineate what such regulations should
look like. California, the first state to legalize and regulate on-demand
transportation services, defines TNC as an “online-enabled app or platform
to connect passengers with drivers using their personal vehicles.”184 In
promulgating these rules, the California Public Utilities Commission said,
“The primary distinction between a TNC and other TCPs [Transportation
Charter Permits] is that a TNC connects riders to drivers who drive their
personal vehicle, not a vehicle such as a limousine purchased primarily for
a commercial purpose. To that end, a TNC is not permitted to itself own
vehicles used in its operation or own fleets of vehicles.”185 The definition,
thus, relies on the provider’s and firms’ infrastructures: i.e., whether it is a
private car used to leverage idle capacity or a car designated predominantly
for commercial use.
The interpretation of the term “personal vehicle” is a source of fierce
debate.186 On the one hand, opponents of on-demand firms argue that
Uber’s and Lyft’s programs to lease and sell vehicles to their drivers blur
this line between traditional taxi drivers who use cars designated primarily
to drive passengers and TNC drivers who, under these programs, do the
same.187 Thus, critics argue, TNCs that sell and lease cars to their providers
should abide by traditional regulations.188 On the other hand, the TNCs
183
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See id. at 7. In their concluding discussion, the commentators argued:
With the proliferation of business relationships between TNCs and car rental agencies
and manufacturers for the express purpose of providing vehicles to be used for TNC
services, it seems clear that there is no meaningful difference between TCP limousine
services and TNC services. TNCs now control fleets by proxy, and TNC drivers drive
vehicles procured for purely commercial purposes. As TNC law continues to evolve,
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oppose what they perceive as a narrow definition of “personal vehicle”;
and, further, they contest imposing restrictions based on a vehicle’s
designation.189 When first promulgating these rules, the Commission did
not clarify the definition of “personal vehicle.”190 In the second phase of
rulemaking, the Commission decided to postpone its ruling on the topic
until the third phase, to allow parties to submit their comments,191 but
stated, for the time being, that “[l]ease or rental agreements with a term of
less than four months are not permitted as a form of personal vehicle
ownership for TNC drivers.”192 In its recent proposed decision regarding
the definition of “personal vehicle,” the Commission revised its position to
define “personal vehicle” to mean a vehicle that is “owned, leased, rented
for a term that does not exceed 30 days[,]” instead of the previous definition
of “less than four months.”193 Thus, although the issue has still not been
finally determined, it seems that California’s regulations concerning
operation of TNCs incorporate distinctions between activities involved with
excess capacity and those that are not.
The particular details about where the Commission will draw the line
between cars for professional use and those involving increased utilization
are still unclear and subject to modification.194 It is still to be seen whether
the Commission will embed these characteristics further,195 creating
we urge the Commission to subject TNCs to the same safety requirements imposed on
TCP limousine services.
Id.
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Id. at 3.
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171329614.pdf. Compare id., with Decision on Phase II Issues, supra note 189, at 3
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On October 26, 2016, the California Public Utilities Commission opened a Phase III
in the rulemaking proceeding. Phase III.B. Scoping Memo and Ruling of Assigned Comm’r,
at 1 (Cal. P.U.C. Apr. 4, 2017), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M183/
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genuine distinctions between workers in increased excess capacity and
those who essentially operate the same as traditional taxicabs but have less
burdensome regulatory requirements to follow.
In any case, the
Commission’s work illustrates regulations that attempt to distinguish
between the two activities based on the infrastructure used.
In the short-term rental market, some municipalities—to differentiate
casual lessors from those who do not leverage idle capacity—place a limit
on the number of nights that residents can lease their properties for shortterm stays.196 The assumption is that a small number of transactions signals
providers who are merely increasing their utilization of excess capacity,
while those who exceed this threshold operate commercially. For example,
in San Francisco, the threshold is ninety days a year,197 and Seattle has
introduced a similar restriction (currently pending).198 Vancouver, British
Columbia, in its pending proposal, has decided not to adopt a distinction
based on maximum number nights because “tracking and enforcing a
nightly rental cap is extremely difficult and poses a high administrative
burden with unpredictable results.”199 Instead, the proposed regulations in
Vancouver will permit short-term rentals only by those who are defined as
“principal residents.”200 For a lessor to demonstrate that she is the principal
resident of a unit, she would have to present evidence that she controls the
rented unit (as owner or tenant) and provide proof of regular personal
business at this address—indicated by a utility bill with the lessor’s name or
other government identification that shows she actually lives at the address
in question.201 The premise of this “principal resident” proposal is that such
category distinguishes between units that are primarily for short-term
rentals and those that are available only through increased utilization.

the Proposed Decision for Phase III.A. because the period for comment on the Proposed
Decision has not elapsed, on April 7, 2017, the Commission opened Phase III.B. of the
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rulemaking proceeding in the third quarter of 2017. See id. at 8.
196
See infra notes 197–198 and accompanying text.
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Resident occupies the Residential Unit for no less than 275 days out of the calendar year in
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198
See generally Regulating Short Term Rentals, SEATTLE.GOV, https://www.seattle.gov/
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How should the policymaker decide which on-demand activity crosses
the line from casual use (work in increased utilization) to commercial
work? This is different from the previous query, which was how to
differentiate between the two activities. Here, the examination is: at what
point do lawmakers think an activity is becoming more commercial in
nature? How do lawmakers draw such line between activities? Said
differently, at what point does an activity considered to produce mainly
positive externalities morph into one that produces more negative
externalities? For instance, in short-term rentals, should the line be set at
thirty days a year, sixty days a year, ninety days a year?
Indeed, in some cases, it is not easy to draw the line between pursuits.
The resolution here should rely on the negative externalities that
commercial use may produce. The city of San Francisco decided that
ninety days a year was the limit, because they evaluated that that was the
point at which short-term rental revenue would break even with long-term
rentals (the amount of money a lessor would make renting from a tenant for
a whole year).202 Thus, if the city allows a provider to offer short-term
rentals for more than ninety days a year, it incentivizes lessors to convert
long-term rentals to short-term ones.203
Further, take, for example, the stories in this Introduction regarding
individuals who use Airbnb in various ways. Ryan Scott, who owns twelve
units in San Diego and manages an additional ten units, is on the extreme
end of the spectrum (working consistently with new infrastructure and thus
very likely inflicting damage on the housing market and possibly on the
fabric of the community).204 Next, Jeannie Ralston, who converted an
apartment originally used for resident rental to one for short-term rental,
also does not work in increased excess capacity.205 Conversely, Jordan
Reeves, a casual user who leases the property when it is otherwise not used,
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Contra Emily Green, SF Deals Major Blow to Airbnb with Tough Short-Term Rental
Law, S.F. GATE (Nov. 15, 2016, 10:26 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/SF-dealsmajor-blow-to-Airbnb-with-tough-10617319.php (NYU business professor Arun
Sandararajan disputes whether San Francisco’s 90-day policy truly achieves the city’s stated
objective of promoting long-term rentals: “The story that is being told is that people take
units off the long-term rental market to rent them on Airbnb . . . But if you look at the data . .
. it is very clear that if there is any effect that Airbnb is having on the availability of longterm rentals, it is very small compared to the effects of rent stabilization and population
growth.”).
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Cf. id.
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See Weisberg, supra note 4.
205
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is on the other end of the spectrum—a classic case of someone whose
activities fall within the utilization of idle capacity.206
Of all the cases discussed, Michael Naess—who, seventy times per year,
rents a room within his own property while he is present—introduces the
most challenging case.207 On the one hand, if we look only at the
infrastructure he uses, he is clearly leveraging otherwise-dead capital: the
extra room in his own home.208 What is more, by always staying in the
apartment, he insures that his guests are not going to be too noisy or create
certain kinds of safety concerns; so, his situation avoids some negative
externalities.209 It is not surprising, then, that such use is almost always
considered legal.210
On the other hand, looking at the frequency of transactions and other
possible negative externalities, we might conclude that his activity is
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum of utilization. This is because
Naess uses the room for short-term rentals constantly (rather than
casually).211 As a result, his neighbors might feel unsafe or uncomfortable
having new people in the hallway every few days. In a municipality in
which short-term rental owners do not pay hotel tax, it can also mean loss
of revenue to the city.212 Therefore, Naess’s case presents a challenge in
drawing the line. In a world with perfect legislation and no enforcement
problems, lawmakers may designate it as a “semi-excess capacity” activity
and impose only some limitations on its use. But in a less than perfect
world, the lawmaker will need to decide whether such use crosses the line
or not.
After policymakers are able to draw the line and differentiate the two
activities, the next substantial issue is the content of the regulations: which
obligations and rules are attached to each category? Fundamentally,
activities in increased utilization produce positive externalities—they offer
more choice for consumers and providers. Lawmakers should support the
innovation and its results by allowing people to leverage their goods, time,
and skills. Because transactions based on increased utilization are different
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from other, traditional work in the level of negative externalities they
produce, each category should be governed by a different set of rules.213
Lawmakers should, thus, create two different categories of activities
based on the spectrum of excess-capacity utilization. Activities based on
increased excess capacity should be regulated lightly and tailored to casual,
unsophisticated providers. Traditional work done through platforms should
be governed by the same rules as incumbents unless there is a significant
reason justifying a departure from these regulations.
But this does not mean that transactions in increased excess capacity
should be a regulation-free zone. For some types of regulations—such as
safety—this distinction may not matter at all because lawmakers can
reasonably insist that, for these critical areas, there is no difference between
work in increased excess capacity and other work. A part-time driver can
cause the same harm as one who drives regularly if she drives an unsafe
vehicle or without adequate insurance. Thus, lawmakers should impose
safety requirements—criminal-background checks, vehicle inspections,
insurance coverage—in a way that assures public safety and reasonable
allocation of risk. The category of activities in increased excess capacity,
thus, should come under minimal regulation: only to protect safety and
prevent market failures.
In other aspects, regulations can take a different form from those
imposed on incumbents or on incumbent-like work operated through ondemand platforms. Hotel tax provides an interesting test case. San
Francisco, which created a new regime responding to the problems caused
by on-demand short-term rentals, imposes on short-term Airbnb
transactions an occupancy tax (collected by Airbnb) equivalent to that
levied on hotels.214 However, a regime premised on the distinction between
transactions on the spectrum of utilization may reasonably levy different tax
rates for these activities since they may vary in the type of visitors they
attract and in their use of municipalities’ infrastructures. Hotels are more
likely to draw businesspeople who use infrastructure as convention centers
or performing arts centers.215 Conversely, visitors who turn to Airbnb to
experience a location from a local’s perspective may be less likely to use
some of these infrastructures.216 Airbnb units offered by casual users also
may be located in parts of town that are less touristic in their nature; thus,
213
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revenue from hotel tax is less targeted to these areas.217 Further, as renting
out rooms or units on a short-term basis provides more business to these
less-visited municipal areas, lawmakers can even incentivize people to visit
the areas.218 Thus, unlike the path taken by San Francisco, a municipality
may be justified in creating a different hotel-tax rate for transactions based
on casual use.
Alternatively, municipalities can impose a tax—equal to its “regular”
hotel tax—on short-term rentals located in the central tourist zones, while
creating a reduced tax for short-term rentals in other zones. This should not
create an extra administrative burden or confusion, because, in regulated
regimes, lessors must register their units; the city can inform them of their
hotel tax rate at the time of registration.
In a similar vein, in employment situations, lawmakers should treat fulltime workers in the on-demand economy differently than they treat casual
providers in that same economy. The former are not substantially different
from traditional employees. On-demand firms exert a level of control over
these workers very similar to employers’ control over traditional
employees.219 In the transportation arena, Uber and Lyft have created
various programs to incentivize their drivers to provide more hours a
week—to make them “super-drivers.”220 For instance, Lyft’s Power Driver
Bonus program requires drivers to put in some minimum hours a week, plus
maintain a 90% acceptance rate.221 In return, Lyft waives most of its
commission to drivers who fulfill these requirements, thus granting them
approximately 20% more than they would otherwise be paid.222 Lyft and
Uber exert more control over workers who work voluminous hours. The
flexibility attendant to the “independent contractor” status is lost once the
driver is incentivized to work more hours a week and not to refuse riders.
These drivers’ level of income dependence on the employer is also
strong.223 Thus, when it comes to workers who are not using their increased
217
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excess capacity, they should be recognized as traditional “employees” for
the purpose of benefits and protections. Indeed, some courts around the
world have determined that Uber drivers should be classified as
“employees.”224
However, treating such workers as traditional employees does not mean
that more casual workers (those truly leveraging their excess capacity)
should not enjoy any rights and benefits. While these providers are not akin
to traditional employees and enjoy a degree of flexibility, they should still
receive basic protections, including minimum wage and overtime pay. A
few commentators have proposed that lawmakers create a special
category—an intermediate level—between employee and independent
contractor, which includes basic employment protections and benefits.225 So
far, even jurisdictions that have regulated TNCs have not addressed the
employment status of workers in that sector. The problem with this
omission is that leaves the final decision about employment status to courts.
Indeed, courts all around the globe are now facing lawsuits on this issue.226
But courts are limited in what they can do: they can decide whether
workers are classified as employees or independent contractors but cannot
create an intermediate status that incorporates the distinction between those
who work in increased excess capacity and those who do not.
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In addition to creating new content, the new rules for the increased
excess capacity category must be clear and easy to follow, and impose the
least administrative burdens possible. They should be designed with the
awareness that these providers are micro-earners rather than sophisticated
players with resources to hire legal counsel. Another benefit of a clear and
easy-to-follow regulatory regime is that it prevents the lost benefits that
stem from evasion of the law. The risk of not having such a regime is a
market that operates underground, thus reducing revenue from tax
collection and putting drivers and customers at risk.
San Francisco provides a tale about how not to do it. The City created a
license regime not only limiting the number of nights a lessor may offer her
unit for short-term use but also requiring registration with the
municipality.227 The registration is comprised of two steps. First, the lessor
must obtain a San Francisco Business Registration Certificate.228
Afterward, the lessor must schedule an in-person appointment to register
her unit with the Office of Short-Term Rentals.229 The fee for such
application, initially set at $50,230 was changed to $250 in November
2016.231 Lessors are also required to submit a quarterly report detailing all
of the stays in their units during the past three months.232
With such an onerous and complicated process, it is not surprising that
most lessors in San Francisco are out of compliance.233 As of April 2016,
2,587 lessors had obtained the business registration; yet, as of July 2016,
only 1,472 had registered with the Office of Short-Term Rentals234 out of at
least 7,000 entire-units that are regularly offered in San Francisco (and
likely many more).235 Predictably, the City’s Board of Supervisors
227
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attributes some of this massive noncompliance to the complexity of the
registration. The board states that “[t]he two-stage process with separate
business tax registration and short-term rental host registration processes
might deter or confuse otherwise compliant short-term rental hosts.”236 The
report also questioned the fact that registration requires physical attendance
at the office: “Ideally, the entire registration process could be completed
online, assuming sufficient mechanisms could be established to verify the
identity of hosts, as well as home ownership and residency status. This
would remove what could be one of the most significant barriers to
compliance . . . .”237
Compare San Francisco’s approach to the one currently pending in
Vancouver. In recommending a system that will require “principal
residents” to register if they want to offer their units for short-term rent, the
process will be “easy to understand, [and] inspires high levels of voluntary
compliance.”238 To achieve this goal, the proposal states, “Lessons learned
from short-term rental licensing recommend a simple, inexpensive, online
licensing system where applicants post copies of the above evidence and
self-declare the evidence is true and that they will comply with short-term
rental regulations.”239 The approach taken by Vancouver thus distinguishes
between casual and commercial users not only by differentiating the
activities but also by reducing barriers to compliance. San Francisco’s
system, which aims to do the same, creates obstacles to participation by
laypeople who harmlessly wish to capitalize on their underutilized goods.
In summary, various municipalities are now experimenting with
regulations that embed these principles. And while no state, city, or town
has yet promulgated a perfect set of rules, these initial responses provide a
good guideline for what works and what does not. There is a challenge in
crafting policy that distinguishes between on-demand activities,
encouraging one and constraining the other. But there is also some
promise.
CONCLUSION
The on-demand firms and their proponents often emphasize the way that
microearners—nonprofessional providers—are now able to participate in
markets that were previously reserved to incumbents. The new economy is
that around 76.6% of Airbnb lessors are noncompliant with the law. See BROUSSEAU ET AL.,
supra note 227, at 2.
236
Id. at 26.
237
Id. at 27.
238
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239
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equalizing in allowing anyone, without the need to invest in new materials,
the chance to maximize her skills, time, and goods.240 In this tale, the new
economy disrupts monopolies, obsolete regulations, and corrupted
industries.241 Those who oppose this view are portrayed as self-serving or
as oppositionists to innovation who cannot get used to new technologies.242
For consumers, it is easy to buy into this narrative. They see that they are
now paying less for accommodations at their favorite tourist destinations
and they can find cheaper rides.243 For others, renting their home
occasionally is a means to survive the growing cost of housing and other
basic services.244 Imposing restrictions on such usage reasonably seems
like hampering a legitimate way to improve their well-being.
But this narrative ignores a sea change that is occurring under the
auspices of the storyline proffered by the on-demand firms, their lobbyists,
and their supporters.245 The on-demand economy opens a wide door to
those who are far from being laypersons who maximize their underutilized
excess capacity.246
Too often, on-demand platforms are used for
commercial services without in any way leveraging idle capacity—and
without the protection of the rules that control incumbent markets.247 The
on-demand firms turn a blind eye to these usages and frequently even feed
them.248 The consequences of this phenomenon of the on-demand market
on our lives are becoming clear: it impacts fundamental employment
structures, threatens the fabric of neighborhoods, and further restricts
housing availability.249 The boosters of this non-gig economy attempt to
hide this aspect of the market, but it is sizeable and noticeable: companies
now advise people where they should buy units for short-term investment,
and more workers provide services without having basic employee
protections. If the on-demand firms wanted to curtail commercial use of
their goods and services, they could easily do so. However, these
commercial transactions are vastly profitable to them; therefore, more often
than not, despite their contrary rhetoric, they encourage such transactions.
For consumers, it is easy to ignore the problems of the commercial side of
the on-demand economy, since they see the more convenient and less
240
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expensive services that that economy has helped to create. But this headin-the-sand attitude comes with a price to others: one’s cheaper vacation or
more-available ride is another’s difficulty in finding housing or stable
employment.
Obviously, not all is bad in the on-demand economy. The opposite, in
fact, is true: in its essence, the narrative that the on-demand firms sell us is
real. It does offer exciting new economic and social opportunities for those
who use these platforms to maximize their underutilized resources. A
policy that distinguishes between the two types of activities discussed here
would allow our society to get the most benefit out of this model while
restraining the harms that can be—and are being—inflicted.250
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